Select the Web Of Science database from the Resources A-Z list in the Online Library.Alternatively you can sign up via Facebook or LinkedIn If you would like to continue using your account after you leave the university register with a personal account. The email address does not have to be a university one. Go to and click Log in in the top right hand corner of the screen.In order to access the enhanced UoB account you must register in either of the following ways: IMC, 2014.EndNote Online accounts are freely available to everyone but as a member of the University of Brighton you are entitled to an enhanced account which allows you access to more storage space and referencing styles. Analysis of SSL certificate reissues and revocations in the wake of Heartbleed. When Private Keys Are Public: Results from the 2008 Debian OpenSSL Vulnerability.
A Tangled Mass: The Android Root Certificate Stores.
The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-browser Software. Why Eve and Mallory Love Android: An Analysis of Android SSL (in)Security. Cache-, hash- and space-efficient bloom filters. Ten Risks of PKI: What You're not Being Told about Public Key Infrastructure. Analysis of the HTTPS Certificate Ecosystem. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations. Forced Perspectives: Evaluating an SSL Trust Enhancement at Scale. An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Chrome's CRLSets.Here's My Cert, So Trust Me, Maybe?: Understanding TLS Errors on the Web. Alice in Warningland: A Large-scale Field Study of Browser Security Warning Effectiveness. DigiNotar SSL certificate hack amounts to cyberwar, says expert. Network applications of bloom filters: A survey. Overall, our results paint a bleak picture of the ability to effectively revoke certificates today. We also examine the CRLSet infrastructure built into Google Chrome for disseminating revocations we find that CRLSet only covers 0.35% of all revocations. We then study the revocation checking behavior of 30 different combinations of web browsers and operating systems we find that browsers often do not bother to check whether certificates are revoked (including mobile browsers, which uniformly never check). Using 74 full IPv4 HTTPS scans, we find that a surprisingly large fraction (8%) of the certificates served have been revoked, and that obtaining certificate revocation information can often be expensive in terms of latency and bandwidth for clients. In this paper, we take a close look at certificate revocations in the Web's PKI. While the overall SSL ecosystem is well-studied, the frequency with which certificates are revoked and the circumstances under which clients (e.g., browsers) check whether certificates are revoked are still not well-understood. Critical to the security of any public key infrastructure (PKI) is the ability to revoke previously issued certificates.